Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have apparently decided to cooperate with each other in eradicating terrorism. The decision came about in a meeting in Riyadh on July 25 between Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz and Prime Minister Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain. Some reports also suggest the two sides are thinking in terms of creating a joint task force to exchange intelligence and carry out operations.
This is not a new development. A formal framework for cooperation was decided last year in October when Prince Abdullah came to Pakistan on a two-day visit after attending the 10th Organisation of Islamic Conference summit in Putrajaya in Malaysia. Like the 1980s when Pakistan had a brigade-plus strength of troops based in Saudi Arabia, primarily for the security of the House of Saud, this ‘cooperation’ too seems geared towards getting Pakistani forces to operate within Saudi Arabia against an internal threat to the monarchy. The only difference this time round is the fact that Pakistan itself is also threatened by radical Salafi extremism and therefore can use a direct linkage with the Saudi intelligence agencies to operate more effectively within its own territory. So there is a big element of mutual support in this venture. To that extent, the development is welcome and must be pursued further without too much delay.
Having said that, however, let us point to an important consideration. Much of what we are witnessing today in terms of the radical Salafi threat is the doing of the House of Saud itself. Before any of the radicals came online and began to threaten Saudi Arabia and the rest of the world, it was the Saudi monarchy that upheld — and still does — the banner of Wahhabism. Somewhat arbitrarily and wrongly, the monarchy decided that Wahhabi conservatism could never result in a radical expression. This was not to be because the Puritanism of the creed was essentially pegged to evangelicalism. When it mated with the radical elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, the conservative Wahhabism gave birth to radical Salafism. This Salafism was tempered in the jihadi fires of Afghanistan and spread through the global networks of the Islamist International that came to fight in Afghanistan.
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, both, were heavily involved with these radicals; so was the United States. All three are now reaping what they had sowed in the ‘80s. The religious establishment that the Saudi monarchy allowed to operate and the ultra-orthodoxy that seeped into the political and social fabric of the kingdom have all contributed to the process. Nothing manifests it better than the life and status of clerics like Sheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Baz. It was Bin Baz’ student Juhema Ibn Saif Al Utaiba, who, along with his followers, attacked and captured the Ka’aba in 1980. This was not a coincidence but an inevitable result of the Wahhabi orthodoxy meshing with radical Islam and producing the explosive mix of Salafism. Even so, the monarchy kept funding Wahhabi causes throughout the Muslim world and even among Muslim communities in the rest of the world. Its response to the emerging threats was to bribe the radical elements by giving them more money on the one hand and seeking ‘protective services’ from countries like Pakistan and the United States on the other hand. Ironically, this element of seeking US protection and being a close US ally while propounding Wahhabism at home proved the biggest contradiction in the end. Saddam Hussain’s invasion of Kuwait was just the event that gave a fillip to the situation.
We do not see many signs that the Saudi monarchy, while being alive to the danger of radical Salafism, is in the process of doing anything substantial to strike at the roots of this phenomenon. Its conservatism — political and social — stays much as it was. There are hints at reform but the deeds don’t match the words. The system remains closed both politically and socially. True, unbridled glasnost at this stage could backfire on the kingdom. It is also true however that some measures need to be taken to let off steam. At this juncture it would perhaps be a better bet to begin with social opening up and follow through on it with controlled ventilation on the political side.
States like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, if they are really serious about cleaning the silt they have gathered over the years through their ill-thought policies, need to take substantial steps, not merely mouth platitudes, to stem the tide. This advice we have been giving Islamabad for a long time. And this is the medicine we are obliged to prescribe for Riyadh. To eradicate terrorism, first do away with the contradiction that has informed the system. Nothing less will do.
copyright 2004 - The Daily Times
